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Abstract: 
We propose an endogenous growth model that incorporates the importance of 
business contacts and informal contacts. In our model, sold output increases 
with the stock of business contacts. The modelling 
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We propose an endogenous growth model that incorporates the
importance of business contacts and informal contacts. In our model,
sold output increases with the stock of business contacts. The mod-
elling of contact creation is based on matching theory. The cost of
creating contacts decreases with more Community level Social Capital
and Market Institutions, which we understand as networks of informal
contacts.
Technological growth is driven by the replacement of contacts within
the economy. Political interference and centralization can provide dis-
incentives to break old contacts and hence aﬀect innovation. Simula-
tions suggests that our model is in line with empirical observations.
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11 Introduction
In this paper we propose an endogenous growth model th a td e t a i l st h er o l eo f
business contacts in development.1 We draw attention to the fact that search
frictions make existing contacts between market parties valuable and give an
indirect productive role to all the networks and institutions that ease these
frictions. Business contacts - representing knowledge about the existence,
reliability and trustworthiness of potential trading partners (suppliers and
clients) - are a productive input and require labour time to ﬁnd. We name
these contacts Relational Capital. Some of these potential trade links become
obsolete in the process of technological progress. The termination of contacts
by one transaction partner has a negative external eﬀect on other partners.
The externality of technological upgrading is inspired by the ‘disorgan-
isation’ models of Blanchard and Kremer (1997) and Roland and Verdier
(1999) who relate output falls of whole economies to the negative externality
of break-ups between trading partners. In these models though, ﬁrms have
no explicit dynamic stock of productive relations and there is no labour cost
of making contacts.
Our view of the process of innovations diﬀers subtly from existing ar-
guments in the endogenous growth theory. As in Romer (1986, 1994) we
assume that innovation occurs on the level of the individual ﬁrm. We add
the idea that innovation requires the destruction of some of the business con-
tacts of a ﬁrm because new products require new suppliers and new clients.
This is a form of creative destruction, where established business contacts
are terminated by one party in the process of innovation. Our notion of
creative destruction does not focus on products made obsolete but on con-
tacts made obsolete. Our view agrees with the observation of Aghion and
Howitt (1998, pg. 1) that “economic growth involves a two-way interaction
between technology and economic life: technological progress transforms the
very economic system that creates it”.
1While this paper discusses development broadly deﬁned, in a companion paper we
also apply the main ideas speciﬁcally to transition economies (Bezemer et al, 2003).
2Economies in our model can diﬀer is several respects. First, the labor
cost of creating Relational Capital may be diﬀerent. That is, for reasons of
existing networks or institutions ﬁrms in an economy may face lower labor
cost to establish new contacts. Second, economies may diﬀer in the embedded
opposition against the replacement of contacts - which is in our eyes necessary
for technological advancement. Political interference, including corruption
and lobbying, as well as centralization reduce the eﬃciency of ﬁrms to seek
new contacts to replace old ones. Opposition towards the replacement of
contacts increases the relative labor cost of contact replacement compared to
the addition of new contacts.
Our Model bears some parallels with the literature on social capital. In
this literature there exists a dichotomy between an individual level and a
community level concept of social capital. The concept of individual level
social capital concurs with Arrow’s (1999) demand that capital should be
something that is individually accumulated. Glaeser et al. (2002) provide a
nice illustration of the ”size of a rolodex” as a measure of the social capital
an economic agent holds. Putnam (2000) and Burt (2000) see the size of
an agents network as a measure of his or her social capital. In this respect,
Relational capital can be interpreted as individual level Social capital. Com-
munity level social capital does not equate with assets of individuals but
exists at a community level. Bowles and Gintis (2002), Knack and Keefer
(1997), Nooteboom (2002), Robison et al. (2002), Sobel (2002) are propone-
nents of this view. They all see that trust, ”sympathy among amgents” etc.
to facilitate the creation of productive contacts. througfh this channel, they
argue it enhances the economic growth of an economy. We argue below that
high levels of community level social capital, i.e. trust, decrease the labor
cost of ﬁnding new contacts, which can be added to the stock of contacts
or used to replace ”old” contacts. Market Insitutions (North, 1990) have a
similar eﬀect.
We set out our model in the next section. In section 3 we provide some fur-
ther evidence from the literature that support our model. Section 4 presents
3a series of simulations to get an understanding of role of RC and Community
Social Capital for diﬀerent development paths and political environments.
We distinguish between exogenous ‘big bang’ transitions, exogenous transi-
tions of slow but inevitable change, and endogenous developments. Section
5 concludes and raises issues for further research. The Appendix provides
micro-foundations for most parts of our model and shows how we calculated
the simulations.
2 A Model of Relational Capital and Growth
We deﬁne a continuum of representative proﬁt-maximizing ﬁrms. Consump-
tion is not explicitly considered, but ﬁrms can be viewed as owned by house-
holds who provide a ﬁxed endowment of labor to the economy. Households
consume all of their income except a constant share s as speciﬁed below.
Firms produce a homogeneous good with unit price. Technology is described
by a production function with three inputs: labor, physical capital and con-
tacts. Thus, Relational Capital (RCt) is a capital stock, and can be thought
of as the number of business contacts. It is an input in sold output yt.
The diﬀerence to the standard deﬁnition of output is that market frictions
necessitate business contacts. Having RC as an input is our way of modelling
the search costs of ﬁnding partnerships needed for buying inputs and selling
output. We deﬁne sold output by
yt = y(A,Lt − L
rc
t ,RC t,K t) (1)
where yt is sold production at time t; Lt is the labor force, Lt−Lrc
t is net
labor input into physical production(; Lrc
t is labor devoted to the creation of
RCt; At is the technology parameter; Kt is physical capital. y(.) is a constant-
returns-to-scale function with all the usual Inada-properties: any input faces
decreasing positive marginal returns and is technically complementary to any
other input.
The economy has a continuum of such ﬁrms with a measure of 1. This
4allows us to use ¯ yt, Lt, Kt, and RCt as the total amount of output, labor and
capital stocks in the whole economy. As in standard macroeconomic growth
models we assume the following functional form for our analysis
yt = y(Atf(Lt − L
rc
t ,RC t),K t) (2)
where Atf(Lt − Lrc
t ,RC t) is a single composite input: technology At is
the productivity of the combination of labor and contacts, similar to a labor
augmented (or Harrod-neutral) technology in the standard textbook model.
Assumptions on f(.) are implicitly given by the assumptions on y(.).
Firms select levels of Lt and Kt and invest in the stock of RCt by allocating
labor Lrc
t . We distinguish between Drc
t , t h ea m o u n to fc o n t a c t sr e p l a c e d ,a n d
Nrc
t , the amount of contacts added. Replacing contacts implies destroying an
old contact and creating a new one, as illustrated in ﬁgure 1 (page 8) below.
Firms selecting positive levels of Drc
t and Nrc
t meet on a market for con-
tacts. Firms, and therefore business contacts, are taken to be heterogeneous,
leading to search frictions in the matching process. As in most of the search
literature (e.g. Pissarides, 2000; Petrongolo and Pissarides, 2001; and Frijters
and Van der Klaauw 2005), we do not explicitly model this heterogeneity.2
We capture its eﬀect by positing contact search costs in terms of labor time







t with λt > 0,ϕ t ≥ 1 (3)
where λt denotes the conversion rate of labor Lrc
t into relations. In terms
of search theory, λt can be interpreted as the arrival rate of contacts. We
capture the relation between business contacts and social or market networks
by positing that λt depends positively on both Community Social Capital and
2This diﬀers from social network models such as Jackson and Wolinsky (1996), Vega-
Redondo (2003) or the growth model by Routledge and von Amsberg (2003). In those
models the stability and/or trustworthiness of speciﬁc links between agents is analyzed.
We abstract from identities of partners by assuming these problems are captured implicitly
b yam a t c h i n gf u n c t i o n .
5Market Institutions. In the next section, we elaborate on this and provide
references to the literature.
Since destroying an old contact constitutes a negative externality (the
loss of the value of a contact) to the old business partner, these have an
incentive to pre-empt by making contact destruction costly. (ϕt − 1 )i s
the cost a ﬁrm incurs when breaking a contact with another ﬁrm, over and
a b o v et h ec o s t so fj u s tﬁnding a new contact. We assume that raising the
cost of breaking contacts is possible via the political process. If there is some
degree of political interference in ﬁrms’ matching choices, ϕt ≥ 1 denotes the
degree to which the political process frustrates the replacement of contacts.
In completely decentralized economies, ﬁrms have no power to raise the cost
of breaking contact and ϕt =1 : replacing and adding contacts are equally
costly to the ﬁrm doing it. Political interference in matching choices amounts
to some degree of centralization of markets. The more an economy is centrally
controlled, in this sense, the higher ϕt. We discuss this assumption in the
next section in more detail.
Contact replacement is inextricably linked to technological progress. When-
ever a ﬁrm increases its eﬃciency by initiating a new production method,
producing new products, or changing its internal organization, it will typi-
cally make new demands on its input suppliers or output buyers. Switching
transaction partners will be optimal under new production or sale conditions
since old ‘transaction partners’ were selected so as to match old production
and sale processes. Firms tend to replace contacts as they improve their tech-
nology At. As in Schumpeter (1934) and Routledge and von Amsberg (2003),
the destruction of old contacts is an inevitable by-product of the creation of
new production and sale methods.3 We therefore term the replacement of RC
3Routledge and von Amsberg (2003) provide a game theoretic model of SC based on
the idea of cooperation in a repeated Prisoner Dilemma game. To model growth they
assume too that new trading partners are necessary for technological advancement. In
their model, faster technological development implies shorter times of interaction and
hence a destruction of Community Social Capital in the form of trust. We argue that only
RC diminishes through an externality of replacing contacts. In our model Community
6creative destruction. We explicitly model technological progress as depending
on the extent of contact replacement Drc
t :








t denotes the production frontier at time t. The function 1 >
g(.) ≥ 0 denotes technological ‘catch-up’ resulting from the replacement of
RC per unit of Lt.T h e l a g b e t w e e n Drc
t and At reﬂects the technology




t > 0,g (0) = 0,a n d
∂2g(.)
∂2Drc
t < 0. Appendix 1.3 provides
micro-arguments for this equation.
Because of the externality connected to replacing contacts, the level of
RC does not only depend on own investment decisions, but also (negatively)












RCt−1 equals the probability of an old contact being
destroyed by the creative destruction decisions of other ﬁrms. This proba-
bility is derived endogenously given a stochastic process on the micro level
which we develop in detail in Appendix 1.1. The parameter β equals the net
number of contacts that get destroyed when one ﬁrm replaces an old contact,
destroying his previous partner ﬁrm’s contact. When that ﬁrm is part of a
large value chain of interdependent ﬁrms, β is large.
Figure 1 illustrates the diﬀerence between Nrc
t and Drc
t . For simplicity,
we take β =1 . T h i sr e ﬂects the simplifying assumption that production is
pairwise, i.e. that value chains have a length of two ﬁrms. There are four
ﬁrms in total. Initially, there are productive contacts between ﬁrms 1 and
2, and between ﬁr m s3a n d4 . T h et o pe x a m p l es h o w sw h a th a p p e n sw i t h
creative destruction: ﬁrms 1 and 3 both replace one contact and form a new
contact through search and matching. Both ﬁrms improve their technology
Social Capital can help to reduce the cost of the externality much in line with empirical
evidence (see for example Miguel’s (2003) comment on Routledge and von Amsberg).
7 
Figure 1: Creative destruction (replacing an old contacts) and network ex-
tension
At by doing so. Both abandon the contact they previously had with other
entities. The net eﬀect of this creative destruction is a loss of one contact.
As noted, we can extend this example to situations where the net number
of contacts that are destroyed is larger. If some of these entities are part
of a chain of contacts, the whole chain may become worthless when a single
entity in the chain pulls out. The bottom example shows what happens with
making extra contacts: without changing production processes, both entities
1 and 3 increase their number of contacts. The new contact between these
entities does not force either of them to abandon their previous contacts.
The net eﬀect is an increase in the number of contacts by one.
To close our model, we make some standard assumptions about the move-
ment of total labor units, the technological frontier and physical capital for-
mation:
8Lt = L






We take labor to be constant and capital to follow the Swan-Solow-
assumptions of ﬁxed depreciation, constant savings rate and exogenous tech-
nological frontier progress. This speciﬁcation reﬂects assumptions on the
economy of exogenous savings, no outside investment and a given technolog-
ical frontier.
We make the standard assumption that ﬁrms maximize the discounted
stream of output equal to
P∞
t=0( 1
1+rt)tyt−wL−rKt.This is independent of the
economic system, which is here reﬂected in the centralization parameter ϕt.
This implies that we assume that economic systems do not aﬀect optimization
behavior, but they do aﬀect the constraints ﬁrms face.
3 Support from the literature: Social capi-
tal, Institutions and Growth
We suggest that the costs of making new contacts and replacing old ones
are determined by three factors: Community Social Capital, the quality of
market institutions, and the political process. In this section we provide
some evidence backing our assumptions.
We model Community Social Capital as the size of the informal network
within a community. Contacts facilitate information exchange; as Malecki
(2000) writes, ‘through the economic and social relationships in the network,
diverse information becomes less expensive to obtain’. Nooteboom (2002)
argues that degree of trustworthiness of informal networks, such as family,
ethnic, religious, and civil ties, is larger because participants have non-proﬁts
reasons to intereact. Therefore these networks provide means of obtaining at
lower cost information about potential “trustworthy” trading partners. That
9informal networks facilitate creation of productive and innovative contacts is
illustrated empirically by Murphy (2002), who reports that social networks
of business people in Tanzania support innovation in manufacturing ﬁrms.
He documents that the main reason is an improved quality of information
exchange. The positive link between informal trust and growth is well estab-
lished in the empirical literature (Knack and Keefer, 1997).
In the simulation section below and the appendix 1.2 we model Communal
Social Capital to carry some (positive) network externalities. An arguement
inspired by Diamond (1982) and Howitt and McAfee (1992). The social cap-
ital literature provides a similar - though often not formalized - argument
about informal networks and trust. Sobel (2002) is one example. He argues
that growth of the overall network increases the contact rate, which spurs
further growth of the network. Such a self-enforcing mechanisms can accel-
e r a t eg r o w t hb u ti tc a na l s oc a u s ead o w n w a r ds p i r a lc a u s e db ya ne x o g e n o u s
drop in network size.
In our model Market Institutions4 are a close substitute to Community So-
cial Capital. Market Institutions also determine the costs of making contacts
because by reducing the cost to acquire information about potential trading
partners. Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic (2002) provide empirical support
with respect to ﬁnancial institutions in developing countries. With ﬁnan-
cial transactions, information about the creditworthyness of trading partners
matters. This can be provided on a small scale via social networks, on a
larger scale only formal institutions are able to provide such information.
We now turn to the link between the political system and contact re-
placement. There are three reasons why political-economic systems may
deviate from the assumption that replacing a contact is as (labor) costly as
adding a new contact. The ﬁrst is lobbying and corruption. Politicians and
bureaucrats may be paid by potential losers of creative destruction to stop
ﬁrms planning to replace contacts. Similarily, in a highly centralized system,
4We use the word institution not merely for the rules that these formal organizations
enforce (as in North, 1990), but also for the organizations themselves.
10ﬁrms negatively aﬀected by creative destruction can lobby the political cen-
ter not to allow creative destruction in other ﬁrms, thus making the state a
stakeholder in their interests. Such lobbying has indeed been observed in de-
veloping and transition economies (Rama, 1993; Braguinsky and Yavlinsky,
2000; Gros and Steinherr, 1995) and was prevalent in socialist systems (Nove
1987).
The second reason is nepotism, when politicians and bureaucrats hold a
stake in ﬁrms, other ﬁrms will consider twice to replace a contact: one does
not easily break up with the dictator’s ﬁr m .As i m i l a ra r g u m e n ti sm a d eb y
Agesa (2000) .
At h i r dw a yi nw h i c ht h ep o l i t i c a l - e c o n o m i cs y s t e mm a yr a i s et h ec o s t so f
breaking contacts is economic planning. The literature on central planning
argues that the span of control of the center is typically not suﬃcient to
gather and absorb all the information necessary to make optimal enterprise-
level decisions, among them decisions on the breaking and making of contacts.
Especially the recognition of new technological opportunities is a matter of
local information.5 For socialist economies, this argument is well-known (e.g.
Aslund 2002), and socialist-style central planning constitutes the extreme
case. But also milder cases of economic planning imply that contact selection
by politicians prevails over contact selection by ﬁrms. These are likely to be
sub-optimal contact choices.
In some of the simulation section below, we assume a feedback from higher
RC to ϕt. That contacts can be used as channels of information and ma-
nipulation, and are therefore a means to inﬂu e n c ep o l i t i c si sa r g u e di nG u y
(2000).6 Firms can enploy their contacts to ﬁght for better market institu-
tions and less corrupt and less ‘inﬂuentiable’ politicians.
5l i k e l yi ti st h a tt h o s ea tt h eﬁrm level can reap the beneﬁts of improved technology
and replaced contacts.
6For a more developed model on this speciﬁc issue, see Dulleck and Frijters (2003), who
stress the importance of rents from a resource sector (e.g. oil or minerals) to the behavior
of politicians.
114 Scenarios of Economic Development
Intuitively, the growth properties of any steady state appear trivial: as long
as ϕ<∞ and RCt cannot grow to inﬁnity, then all steady states under all
speciﬁcations will have a growth rate equal to the rate of exogenous tech-
nological change. Since the central problem in development is the uneven
distribution of growth in the medium run, we are more interested in tran-
sition paths under speciﬁc parameter assumptions. We thus only brieﬂy
discuss the maximisation problem, the steady state, and the computation
method for calculating transition paths. Most of the details are relegated to
Appendix 2.
4.1 The Maximisation Problem and Steady States
We try to remain as close to mainstream models as we can in order to be
able to use the ﬁndings of other studies as sources of reasonable parameters.
Our functional form speciﬁcation for output and technology growth is:













which presumes a standard Cobb-Douglas production function and a sim-
ple catch-up process for technological progress.
We here discuss the simplest version of the model, i.e. with a ﬁxed ϕ and
λ.D e ﬁne µt = At
A∗
t−1. In case of interior solutions, the maximization problem















































Kt =( 1 − δ)Kt−1 + syt−1
The two state variables in this model are then µt+1 and RCt. Solving out


















[(1 − δ)Kt−1 + syt−1]
1−γ
where L


































where yt−1 of course depends on µt,µ t−1,R C t, and Kt−1. The ﬁrst-order



































































These Euler equations can be used to ﬁnd candidates for stationary steady
states {µs+1,RC s} that satisfy these necessary conditions. In all the situa-
tions we examined there turned out to be only one candidate. These sta-
tionary steady states were then numerically checked for stability, and used
13to ﬁnd transition paths. Our general approach for this was to presume the
steady state was reached some point in the far future (e.g. after 200 periods),
and solve the transition path backwards.
Finding transition paths is complicated by the presence of non-negativity
constraints on Nrc
t and Dt. These constraints in practise turn out to be
binding in some periods. One would in principle have to check 22∗200 com-
binations of constraints for a transition path of 200 years with 2 possibly
binding constraints each period. The clear infeasibility of doing this forces
us to use approximating heuristics to ﬁnd transition paths. Our method,
w h i c hi ne ﬀect relies on using non-linear optimisation routines to directly
ﬁnd the Rational Expectations optimum of Us, is described in depth in Ap-
pendix 2.
4.2 Parameter choices
We initially take: γ0 =0 .65,γ=0 .7,g 0 =0 .25,g 1 =0 .8,λ (.)=λ0 =0 .1,
ρ =0 .06,s=0 .3,β=1 ,a n da =0 .02. We later discuss alternative scenarios
and change λt accordingly.
As to the initial condition, we presume in all scenarios that the economy
starts with ϕt = ϕ =1 0 0 0 .7 The gap with the technological frontier at
the start of each development trajectory is presumed equal to 100 years of
steady state technological development. At 2 percent technological growth
per year, this works out at a technological ratio of about 1:7, which appears
a reasonable guesstimate. We note that the productivity per unit labor has
a much higher ratio than this, because the level of RC per unit of labor will
also be low at the start of the development trajectory.
Parameter assumptions are selected to reﬂect reality in various ways.
First, they imply that physical capital accounts for 30% of output, produc-
tion labor 45% and RC 25%. This measure of the importance of RC is con-
7This ϕ is so high that no creative destruction has taken place before the start of any
scenario, i.e. the starting situation is the same as the steady state situation of having
ϕ = ∞.
14servative. In a pioneering study, Machlup (1962) estimated the share of all
economic activity in the United Sates devoted to discovering and distribut-
ing information at 29 %. Porat (1977) put it close to 50 %. Second, values
for λt = λ and g0 are suﬃciently high for any economy to be able to catch
up with the technological frontier within two decades if it invested all its re-
sources (hence forgoing all output today, which is obviously not realistic) into
technological progress via RC replacement. Third, parameter values reﬂect
standard assumptions about discount rates (6% a year), saving rates (30%
a year), and the rate of technological progress (2% a year). There remains
arbitrariness especially with respect to ϕt and λt. We discuss robustness of
our results in the last subsection of the simulations.
In many models of development, it is diﬃcult to capture the notion of
systemic change. The two parameters in our model that capture systemic
change are ϕt and λt. A ‘big-bang’ systemic change can be represented as
ao n e - o ﬀ unanticipated change in ϕt and\or λt. A continuous ‘improving’
systemic change is one where ϕt and λt continuously change, presumably
in the direction of perfect markets, i.e. low ϕt and high λt. Endogenous
systemic change is one where ϕt and λt themselves are endogenous. In order
to organize the discussion, we will simulate various scenarios.
4.3 Scenario 1: a transition
Scenario 1 is the development path of an economy that was initially char-
acterized by the steady state of high ϕt and a (low) λt, where overnight all
political control is removed. There are no costs of breaking contacts so that
ϕt = ϕ =1while also the labor costs of matching λt = λ remain constant
over time. In addition to this laisser-faire development path, we also show
the theoretically optimal path a social planner would choose. This serves as
a benchmark of what an optimal policy may accomplish.
Scenario 1 is apt for describing some event - a systemic collapse, a coup,
a sudden policy change - that ends economic control over the economy. The
outstanding example would be the post-socialist transition countries, with
15sudden and comprehensive introduction of liberalizing policy measures. We
assume throughout that ﬁrms maximize discounted-proﬁts and have rational
expectations after the shock. We contrast the outcome of their behavior with
what the optimal solution would be that a benchmark all-knowing social
planner would implement.
Concretely, we assume that at t=0, ϕt suddenly changes from 1000 (vir-
tually total political control) to 1 (no political interference at all), whilst
nothing else changes and λt = λ remains constant. Figures 4a and 4b show
the simulation results for a decentralized transition; Figures 4c and 4d depict
the ’optimal’ path.



































































* series depicted on right hand scale
































































































































* series depicted on right hand scale





























































The decentralized development path is characterized by a large initial
decline in output, sustained over several periods. The decline in output in
the ﬁrst 7 periods is about 50%, which is mainly due to the reduction in
RC and partly due to labor used in creative destruction. Output returns
to the initial output level only after 20 periods. These ﬁgures qualitatively
mimic the real patterns of output ﬂuctuations in formerly centrally planned
economies. The start of reform led in all 27 transition countries to a fall in
output during three to eight years, a fall ‘never before experienced in the
history of capitalist economies (at least in peacetime)’ (Mundell, 1997; see
EBRD, 2003 for ﬁgures). More generally, Greenaway et al (2002), survey
the experience of 25 developing countries which implemented ‘deep’ market
liberalization programmes. In a panel data analysis, they demonstrate that
market liberalization is typically followed by a J-curve output response over
time: output falls steeply initially and recovers afterwards. More recently,
Indonesia after the fall of Suharto and his network in 1998 exhibited a similar
response.
For other parameter choices too8,w eﬁnd that the sudden drop in ϕt
without a change in λt, i.e. the advent of laisser-faire capitalism, destroys
much of the existing networks in the economy. The reason is that the new
8We searched amongst the grid deﬁned by γ0 ∈ {0.5,0.65,0.8},γ∈ {0.6,0.7},
g0 ∈ {0.2,0.5,1},g 1 ∈ {0.5,1.5,4},λ (.) ∈ {0.2,0.4,0.8},β= {1,5},y (.) ∈ {Cobb-
Douglas,CES} .
18system inherits a large network and backward technology. Maximizing ﬁrms
have an incentive to upgrade their technology via high Drc
t , which rapidly
destructs old networks.
Beyond the evidence on transition and developing countries quoted, an-
other empirically veriﬁable implication of this model is that the lifting of
barriers to creative destruction should lead to high demand for labor involved
in networking, i.e. LRC
t ., as opposed to production work. This should be ob-
servable as swift changes in rewards for making contacts. Such an immediate
change has indeed been documented for Slovenia (Orazem and Vodopivec
1997), Russia (Brainerd, 1998; Sabirianova and Sabirianova, 2003 ) the Czech
Republic (Flanagan, 1998) and China (Lee, 1999). These demonstrate that
the returns to management skills, and more generally the skill wage premium,
rose quickly and immediately after the start of the institutional changes.
The negative eﬀects of high levels of creative destruction on the total
level of RC in the ﬁrst periods generate a strong contraction in yt.B e c a u s e
of complementaries, it is accompanied by a reduction in the marginal value
of other production factors labor and capital. This concurs with observed
increasing incidences of poverty and capital ﬂight after market liberalization
measures, of which the post-socialist transition is again an extreme example.
After liberalization, productivity would increase in the surviving ﬁrms
due to the creative destruction they implement. Pavcnik (2000), using plant-
level panel data on Chilean manufacturers, ﬁnds evidence of within plant
productivity improvements following the Chilean liberalization of the early
1980s. She attributes this to ‘the reshuﬄing of resources and output from
less to more eﬃcient producers’. Similarly, Lall (1999) researches the garment
industry in Kenya, Tanzania, and Zimbabwe, based on ﬁrm-level data, and
ﬁnds technology upgrading and improving ﬁrm performance in response to
liberalization. Grant (2001) similarly reports reallocation of enterprise rela-
tions in Ghana after reforms. In particular, his analysis points to increasing
service-sector performance. Abandoning local control in particular led to
rapid re-alignments in Ghana, with foreign companies establishing joint ven-
19tures, developing local products, and joining national stock markets. These
are indications that constituent ﬁrms were changing their production pro-
cesses, their input suppliers and their clients. This may be interpreted as
evidence of much contact replacement Dt.
We now turn to the optimal development path, i.e. the path of a social
planner who would take the externalities of creative destruction into account.
In Figure 4c, the super-planner chooses Drc
t such that there is an initial
output fall of about 30%. The initial levels of creative destruction are about
30% of that of the decentralized transition. The economy recovers to its old
level after 10 periods, with high growth levels recorded in the early years.
Growth in this period is fuelled by growth in the technology used. As in the
earlier simulation, output growth eventually tails oﬀ to the level of exogenous
progress of the technological frontier.
The interesting question is how any realistic policy can mimic the super-
planner solution. The dilemma is that in practice no planner can engage in
creative destruction since this requires decentralized information; but decen-
tralized creative destruction overshoots. An observed policy is a dual track
approach. In the case of China some restrictions on the mobility of labor
and capital are maintained (Tian, 1999). As Roland and Verdier (2003)
comment, such ”...dualism follows the scenario of Chinese transition where
the government keeps direct control over economic resources and where a
liberalized non-state sector follows market rules”. In terms of our model, the
Chinese experience is a way to restrict the actions of a sizeable proportion
of the ﬁrms in the economy, allowing only a fraction to engage in creative
destruction, hence avoiding a cumulation of the external eﬀects.9
The simulations above suggested that our model is capable of capturing
observed economic dynamics after a momentous liberalization. Obviously,
the speed of recovery varies tremendously with parameter variations, but the
9Additionaly, after the reform often local party members obtained the means of pro-
duction form state companies (Lin, 2001). This realigns incentives and implies in our
model a reduction of ϕ. Lee (1999) shows that these companies experience high growth
rates.
20qualitative ﬁnding of an output drop caused by a collapse of RC followed by
a recovery appeared in all parameter values examined.
4.4 Scenario 2: gradual but inevitable system changes
In Scenario 1, it was eﬀectively presumed that political institutions changed
suddenly and completely, whilst there was no change in the rate at which
individuals could make contacts. For many developing countries, it would
seem more apt to assume that both political barriers and contact rates move
slowly towards perfect markets. We leave the question of the endogeneity of
such changes till the next subsection and here take them as inevitable.
Scenario 2 is the development path of an economy that was also initially
characterized by the steady state of a high ϕt and a low λt, which sets upon
a trajectory of ever decreasing ϕt and ever increasing λt. Letting ϕt decrease
represents a gradual development of Market Institutions which lower contact
matching costs, while simultaneously labor costs of contacting are falling.
Again, not only the actual development path, but also the theoretically op-
timal path is shown.
More precisely, starting from the same conditions as above, we assume
that from t =0onwards ϕt =1+ϕ0e−αϕ∗t and λt = λ3 ∗ (1 − e−λ2−λ4∗t).
This describes slowly adjusting ϕt and λt. We take ϕ0 =1 0 0 0 ,α ϕ =0 .05,
λ4 =0 .01,λ 2 =0 .05 and λ3 ∗ (1 − e−λ2)=λ0. These assumptions mean we
allow ϕt to halve its distance towards 1 about every 8 years, and λt to halve
its distance towards λ3 every 40 years. We show simulations with diﬀerent
choices later.
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* series depicted on right hand scale
Again we ﬁnd a sharp decrease in RC with the decentralized path. It is
interesting that the optimal path includes maintaining RC for the ﬁrst 20
years, illustrating the large negative externality of creative destruction on
growth.
We here leave aside the actual composition of the increases in commu-
nity social capital and market institutions (captured by a growing λt). In
practice, market institutions may well replace Community Social Capital due
to increasing returns to scale. Case studies document such substitution in
banking (Ferrary 2003) and legal systems in the case of China (Winn 2002).
224.5 Scenario 3: endogeneity of system change
Scenario 3 is the development path of an economy that was initially char-
acterized by the steady state of a high ϕt and a low λt, which sets upon an
trajectory of endogenous change in ϕt and λt.H e r ew es i m u l a t et h ea s s u m p -
tions - introduced in section 3 - that the larger the market network (reﬂected
in the value of the RCt stock), the smaller ϕt and λt,a n dt h a tm o r eRC
leads to reduced political barriers to creative destruction. As we noted, the
feed-back can lead to cyclical behavior in creative destruction and ϕt,.
We model this endogeneity by taking ϕt =1+ϕ0e−βϕ∗RCt−1 and λt =
λ5 ln(e+RCt−1)ln(e+¯ yt−1) where βϕ =0 .4, and λ5 ln(e+RC−1)ln(e+¯ y−1)=
λ0 which means λ5 =0 .2846. Again, we will vary these assumptions later.
The simulations presented in ﬁgures 6a and 6b result.
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* series depicted on right hand scale
Note the political cycles in the decentralized case, where only after 50
years the economy escapes the trap noted above.10 Note also that the op-
timal development path ﬁr s te n t a i l sap e r i o di nw h i c ht h eR Cn e t w o r ki s
expanded until φ is very low, i.e. ﬁrst the political inﬂuence of politicians
on the economy is removed. Only after that does the economy follow a path
reminiscent of the decentralized path.
10Political cycles and the frequent un-doing of reforms after elections is, according to
the historical analysis of Block (2002), a frequent phenomenon in African countries.
244.6 Robustness analysis
We had some empirics to guide us with respect to basic economic parameter
assumptions. Yet there is simply nothing as yet to base λt and ϕt upon. For
this reason, we give below the decentralized results for alternative assump-
t i o n s( F i g u r e7 ) . T h em a i np o i n tw et a k ef r o mt h i si st h a tr e s u l t sc h a n g e
commensurately with changes in the key parameters.
In the second endogenous simulation, for instance, the growth trap due to
political institutions is so deep, and the contact rates so low, that even after
200 periods, the economy has not yet realized fast growth (average growth is
less than 1.5% a year in this period). In the fourth endogenous growth path,
the political growth trap is so small that the economy virtually immediately
starts catching up and enters the steady state growth path after about 60
years.
In the ﬁrst three exogenous growth paths, we see qualitatively similar
growth paths to the one in Figure 5, i.e. initial decades of very low RC due
to initial creative destruction. Only after 20 years does the growth in λt allow
the economy to achieve high growth levels. Interestingly, in the exogenous
simulations where the political reform is slower (αϕ is low in simulations
4 and 5), the initial collapse of RC does not occur and sustained growth
appears almost immediately.
This dependence of development paths on parameter choices reﬂects the
importance of initial conditions but also the importance of contact rates -
depending, in turn, on market institutions and Community Social Capital -
and the level of political interference with the market.
25Figure 7: development paths under diﬀerent parameter values
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With 1.: αϕ =0 .1,β ϕ =0 .8; With 2.: αϕ =0 .1,λ 2 =0 .1,β ϕ =0 .2.
With 3.: αϕ =0 .1,λ 2 =0 .1,λ 4 =0 .02,β ϕ =0 .2,λ 5 =2∗ 0.2846
With 4.: αϕ =0 .025,λ 2 =0 .1,λ 4 =0 .02,β ϕ =0 .4,λ 5 =2∗ 0.2846
With 5.: αϕ =0 .025,λ 2 =0 .1,λ 4 =0 .005,β ϕ =0 .8,λ 5 =2∗ 0.2846
265 Conclusions
In this paper, we introduced the notion of Relational Capital in an endoge-
nous growth model. RC represents the stock of contacts of individuals in an
economy. RC is an input into sold output. Both Community Social Capital -
which we deﬁne as the size of the informal network - and Market Institutions
reduce the labour costs of creating RC. Political interference in our model
increases the costs of breaking up contacts among ﬁrms. We argue that this
breaking up of contacts is an integral part of technological advancement. If
the political process restricts such creative destruction by raising its costs,
technological backwardness results.
Economic systems with bureaucratic interference through corruption, nepo-
tism or planning lag behind in the level of technology employed according
to our approach. These economies are likely to experience an initial output
fall if they liberalize: technological catch-up potential implies high initial
levels of destroyed and replaced relational capital which incorporates a large
negative external eﬀect. In the simulations such drops indeed occurred en-
dogenously from the optimising behaviour of rational ﬁrms. Our model leads
to support for smoother reforms such as ‘dual track’ approaches discussed
in the literature. One policy instrument to restrict some of the externalities
c r e a t e db yc r e a t i v ed e s t r u c t i o ni st oh a v ec o m p l e t es y s t e m i cc h a n g eo n l yi n
new sectors of the economy.
The simulations suggested another interesting empirical implication. With
endogenous feedbacks from the size of the economy to the costs of replacing
and making contacts, we ﬁnd cycles. These quasi business cycles point to a
coordination phenomenon. When an economy is close to the technology fron-
tier, investment in new contacts is more productive than replacing a contact.
Once the economy is far from the frontier the opposite is true. Coordination
of activity follows from the observation that new contacts live longer if most
of the economy refrains from replacing contacts, hence the relative cost of
replacing a contact is high. Vice versa, new contacts have a low survival rate
if the economy engages heavily in replacing contacts. In this situation replac-
27ing a contact is relatively cheap. A full dynamic analysis of these endogenous
cycles constitutes an interesting extension of our analysis.
There are various avenues that can be pursued further. One is the precise
nature of political interaction. The political system was implicitly deﬁned in
our model as a function of the total stock of RC. The feedback from large
networks to less political frustration of the replacement of contacts needs
a further foundation. In Dulleck and Frijters (2003) we study how and to
what extent those in power frustrate the growth of relational capital, simply
because it poses a political threat to their power.
Another avenue for further investigation centers around the parameter β.
We assume that the complexity of production is exogenous to the model and
time-invariant. In our model β measures the length of a production chain as a
proxy for such complexity. It determines the number of ﬁrms that are aﬀected
by the creative destruction of one element in the chain. A further step in
the analysis would be to endogenize β. The endogeneity of this parameter
may capture the development of productivity in relation to the division of
labor. Empirical observations by Hedlund and Sundstrom (1996) show that
liberalization mostly aﬀects those ﬁrms with the highest value-added, which
usually have the most complex production processes. The ‘primitivization’
of transitional economies can be seen as an endogenous reduction of β.
This set of applications shows the potential of our framework. We oﬀer
it as one way to theoretically connect the literatures on networks to those on
politics and economic growth.
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35Appendix 1: a search model of relational capital.
Appendix 1.1 The basic model of RC
In this appendix we motivate the macro-model of creative destruction by
a micro-search model. We will borrow arguments from the search literature
by exploiting the analogy with the matching process of vacancies and job-
seekers (Petrongolo and Pissarides, 2001).
Denote the number of contacts a representative individual ﬁrm i has by
Ci. Denote the number of extra contacts a ﬁrm makes by Ni and the number
of contacts it replaces by Di. Take the number of ﬁrms M to be large, such
that the proportion of contacts any ﬁrms has is approximately zero. When
ﬁrm i replaces an old contact with a new one, it looses a previous contact. The
ﬁrm j with whom ﬁrm i makes a replacement contact also loses a previous
contact. Hence both ﬁrm i and j remain with the same number of contacts
as before. The externality is that the two ﬁrms that i and j were previously
connected to, lose a contact. If these former contacts were necessary links in
an e t w o r ko fk contacts, the net loss of contacts is β =2 k − 1.T h en u m b e r
of existing, new, and destroyed contacts is assumed large enough to be able
to abstract from indivisibilities.
The timing is as follows. At the beginning of the period, ﬁrms seek extra
contacts and replacement contacts. Then, these latent contacts materialize,
after which production takes place. Then, the technology to be used next
period is updated.
The probability of any contact surviving the process of creative destruc-
tion is equal to (1 − 1 P
i Ci)
P
j6=i βDj which is in the limit (M →∞ )e q u a lt o
e−β
¯ D
¯ C. The number of contacts of ﬁrm i after creative destruction and extra
contacts is equal to Ci ∗e−β
¯ D
¯ C +Ni. Adding time subscripts and re-labelling,
this is the same as the formula for RCt g i v e ni nt h em a i nt e x t . N o t et h a t
here the replacement contacts are treated as cumulative, i.e. it is possible
to replace the same initial contact several times in one period, leading to a
larger technological improvement. In contrast, extra contacts are additive.
36Appendix 1.2 Modelling the endogeneity of contact rates
We can similarly give a micro-foundation for λ(.), i.e. the relation be-
tween labor invested into making new contacts, the number of old contacts
and the number of new (extra and replacement) contacts. We again exploit
the analogy with job search. We thus envisage the process of ﬁnding con-
tacts as follows: denote the amount of labor ﬁrm i allocates towards creating
extra contacts by LN,i and the amount allocated towards replacing contacts
by LD,i. This labor is directly and linearly transformed into ‘active contact
vacancies’ whereby the old contacts involved in replacements are only ac-
tually destroyed if a partner for the replacement contact is found. We can
hence also use (LN,i + LD,i) to denote the number of contact vacancies ﬁrm
i has. We then have a symmetric matching situation whereby LN,i number
of potential contacts of each ﬁrm get matched to the
P
j6=i LN,j potential ex-
tra contacts of other ﬁrms. The total amount of extra contacts can then be




j6=i LN,j). As Petrongolo
and Pissarides (2001) show, there are several micro-mechanisms via which
we can arrive at a linear matching function, implying that the total number
of extra contacts is linear in the number of potential extra contacts. One
such possible mechanism is that each individual latent contact has a ﬁxed
probability λ of being ‘noticed’, which is a ‘ﬁxed advertisement space’ as-
sumption. All these ‘noticed’ latent contacts then get randomly matched to
each other. This then indeed would imply a constant returns to scale match-
ing function and a linear relation between the amount of labor devoted to
making extra and replacement contacts and the number of new extra and
replacement contacts.
The political process can now be summarised by the assumption that
politicians allow a contact replacement to go ahead with probability 1
φt.T o -
gether with the above, this means we get λt∗(LN,it+LD,it)=φtDit+Nit, which
is the same formula as the one in the text.
Now, we can also endogenize λ i naw a yt h a tl i n k si tt ot h en u m b e ro f
contacts already existing in the economy. A natural possibility is to assume
37that it is the two sides of an ‘old’ contact via which latent contacts get noticed.
Assume for instance that there is a constant probability that a latent match is
productive termed λ0. The probability that a latent contact is observed by an
existing contact is inﬁnitesimally small and denoted by λ1. The probability
that an individual latent contact gets labelled as a ‘noticed and productive’
contact is then equal to λ0 ∗ (1 − (1 − λ1)
P
j6=i Cj) which converges to λ0 ∗
(1 − e−λ1M ¯ C). In terms of the formulas in the text, this would mean the
function λ(RCt−1)=λ0 ∗ (1 − e−λ1RCt−1) is a natural candidate which has
the standard convexity properties. Various other micro-mechanisms leading
to such relations also exist however. The key aspect is that the thick-market
externality of Diamond (1982) is incorporated. In the example above, this
thick-market externality is incorporated in the assumption that each side
of an existing contact has an independent probability of noticing a latent
contact. This is a network externality of having many existing contacts.
Appendix 1.3 Foundation of the process of technological change
Finally, we can think of the following stylized micro-foundation to our
process of technological change. Take each representative ﬁrm to consist of
a ﬁxed number of labour units, say Z units. The technology used by each
labour unit i depends on one contact (eg. the machine provider or the service
department of another ﬁrm). Diﬀerent units in the same ﬁrm may or may
not use the same contact as the technology source. Each labour unit i then
combines the other contacts and capital to produce sold output. Economies
of scale ensure that at the ﬁrm level yt increases with RCt.N o w ,t h et e c h n o l -
ogy of the match between unit i and her contact is on average At−1.T h eﬁrm
can search for more contacts (Nt)a n d / o rt oﬁnd diﬀerent technology con-
tacts (Dt). If a unit i changes a technology contact, her previous technology
contact becomes redundant because economies of scale in doing any speciﬁc
task make the productivity of unit i highest when working only with one
technology contact (eg. using one word processing program is more eﬃcient
that working with two simultaneously). The ﬁrm observes two equally sized
sets of candidate contacts it can search from, one for Dt and one for Nt.
38The equal size assumption means the symmetry assumed in the matching
stories above between Dt and Nt remains valid, and the previous matching
arguments go though after appropriate normalisation. The distribution of
technical productivity of potential ‘diﬀerent’ contacts is in continuous ﬂux:
every period, the productivity that unit i would have with a diﬀerent tech-
nology contact j is drawn from a c.d.f. Ht(.),w h e r eHt(At−1)=0and
Ht(At−1 + ga(A∗
t−1 − At−1)) = 1.T h i sm e a n saﬁrm can observe ‘a region of
potential better matches’ that lie within a fraction ga between the produc-
tivity of a current match and the technological frontier. One can think of
Ht(.) as the result of an exogenous, random, and continuous learning process
that other potential matches undergo whilst they are inactive. The expected





t−1 − At−1). Within one period, the process of ﬁnd-
i n gad i ﬀerent set of matches starting from the current (potentially latent)
technology can be repeated many times in the same period until the even-
tual set of contacts is ﬁnally eﬀectuated and the old ones are severed. If
g0 is small, then the expected result of one period of technological change
goes to At−1 +( 1− e−g0)(A∗




is the number of ‘rounds of innovation’ per labour unit in the period. When
Mt is reasonably small, the probability of any contact surviving the contact
destruction by other ﬁrms will approach e−β
¯ D
¯ C.
If we add an exogenous probability (1 − g1) that the ﬁrm is completely
mistaken about each unit’s set of potential new technology contacts (where
the mistake is revealed only after all rounds of innovation), and relate Mt to
Dt, then we get the technological progress function speciﬁed in the simula-
tions.
Appendix 2: Steady states and simulation technique.
In this appendix we describe our approach to deriving steady states and
computing the transition paths. Our general approach is to ﬁnd the steady
39state from the Euler equations and then to solve the transition path by pre-
suming the steady state is reached at some ﬁxed date into the far future and
solving an optimal control problem backwards. Though we simulate various
models, we here merely illustrate our method by taking a simpliﬁed version
o ft h em o d e l .W ep r e s u m ei n t e r i o rs o l u t i o n s( a n dt h u si g n o r en o n - n e g a t i v i t y
constraints), take the case where λ and ϕ are ﬁxed, and hold labor ﬁxed
and drop capital from the model. Also deﬁne µt = At
A∗












































t =( 1 + a)A
∗
t−1 (10)
The 2 state variables in this model are then µt+1 and RCt. First, we solve















































where the decision maker takes
¯ Drc
t
































which uses the envelope theorem: for all other state variables zt / ∈ xs =
{µs,RC s} we know that ∂Us
∂zs
∂zs
∂xs =0be c a u s ei na no p t i m u m∂Us






























































w h e r ew eh a v eu s e dt e r m sl i k eD0
s(µs+1) and D0
s+1(µs+1) to denote spec-
iﬁed complex functions of the state variables. Now, a rational expectations
equilibrium must have RCs = RCs and Drc
s = ¯ Drc
s . Thus inserting the rele-



























































































































































































































































































(1 + a)+µs (g1 − 1)
¤
(1 + a − µs)
We proceed to ﬁnd a stationary growth path. This implies setting RCs =



























































g0(g1(1 − µ)+( g1 − 1)aµ)
D2 =
(1 − µ)(1+a)
g0 [−g1(1 + a)+µ(g1 + a)](1 + a − µ)
which means we have ﬁnally arrived at a 2-equation system in which the
only unknowns are µ and RC. Unfortunately, the functions are analytically
intractable. It is however quite simple for speciﬁc values of all parameters to
solve this system numerically. This would yield a set of rational expectation
stationary steady state values {µ,RC}.
T h ep r o c e d u r ew ea d o p tt oc a l c u l a t et h es i m u l a t i o n si st h ef o l l o w i n g :
1. We go through the steps above to reach an analytical equation for the
model and parameters at hand.
2. We numerically solve for all candidates for a stationary steady state
and pick the one that satisﬁes second-order conditions (we never ﬁnd
more than 1 of these).
3. We presume the steady state is reached at some date s far in the future
(usually 200 years).
4. We then calculate the transition path decisions {µt+1,RC t}f o rt =
0,..,s− 1.
43Now, calculating the transition path decisions is a tricky optimal-control
problem by itself. A popular method in the literature is to take the Euler
equations and either guess backward or forwards. To illustrate, if one uses
forward-shooting one takes as given the initial condition {µ0,RC −1}, and
one then picks an initial guess {µ1,RC 0}. With this initial guess, one uses
the Euler equations to solve for all other {µt+1,RC t}w i t ht =1 ,..,s− 1.
We can then check whether the initial guess is correct by looking at whether
the inferred {µs,RC s−1}s a t i s ﬁes the stationary steady state assumptions
RCs = RCs−1,y s =( 1+a)ys−1, and µs = µs−1. If we then ﬁnd that these
are not satisﬁed, one needs to take a diﬀerent initial guess {µ1,RC 0}.
I no u rc a s ew eh a v et ot a k ea c c o u n to ft h ef a c tt h a tNt and Dt are con-
strained to be positive. Indeed, in many simulation paths these constraints
on Nt and Dt turn out to be binding in many periods. The ‘correct’ proce-
dure would be to check all possible combinations of Nt or Dt being 0 at all
possible times t =1 ,..,s − 1. When applied to forward-shooting, this would
mean that for each initial guess {µ1,RC 0}, one would have to check 22s com-
binations of constraints. For s =2 0 0 , this would mean checking 2.5822*10120
combinations. It will be clear that such an avenue is infeasible. We therefore
















where the decisions of the representative agent now are a1t and a2t, and
where we denote the aggregate choice by {¯ a1t,¯ a2t}. This transformation
prevents the possibility of corner solution but allows choices arbitrarily close
to a corner solution: for very low a1t, Nt gets arbitrarily close to 0. This
approximation in turn however does not allow for forward shooting via the
use of the Euler equations because in the case of a corner solution, the ﬁrst-
44order condition will be violated (i.e. no ﬁnite solution to a1t and a2t).W h a t
this transformation does however allow is to be used as an input into a
search routine for an optimal solution. Because the objective function (=Us)
is highly non-linear we use various search algorithms. A complication of not
b e i n ga b l et ou s et h eE u l e re q u a t i o n si st h a tw em u s tc o n t i n u o u s l yb e a ri n
mind that the representative agent takes the aggregate choice as given. Our
actual heuristic for step 4 is thus:
4a Start at an initial guess for the whole sequence {¯ a1t,¯ a2t} where t =
0,..,s− 1.
4b Use a non-linear optimisation routine to ﬁnd the optimal choices of the
individual agent for {a1t,a2t} where t =0 ,..,s−1, with the aggregate
choices {¯ a1t,¯ a2t} kept constant.
4c If the optimal choices of the individual agent for {a1t,a2t} deviate by
more than a very small amount from {¯ a1t,¯ a2t}, then step 4a is repeated
with the aggregate choices re-set at {a1t,a2t}.
4d Given the optimal solution in terms of {a1t,a2t}, we calculate all other
parameters of the model, including {µt,RC t−1}w h e r et =0 ,..,s− 1.
Now, given enough time, a non-linear optimisation routine should always
ﬁnd the individually optimal sequence {a1t,a2t} given what the aggregate
choice is and thus a sequence for which there holds that {a1t,a2t} is opti-
mal when {¯ a1t,¯ a2t} ={a1t,a2t} should indeed be a Rational Expectations
solution to the whole model.
We numerically checked the stability of the model using the Euler equa-
tions. This entailed linearising {µs−1,µ s,µ s+1,RC s−2,RC s−1,RC s}a r o u n d





















w h i c hi nc o n c i s em a t r i xf o r mc a nb er e - d e ﬁned as
St+1 = B0St + B1St−1
The stability of the equation St+1 = B0St + B1St−1 follows standard
dynamic arguments. One examines the roots of the system solving the normal
equation det(θ
2I −θB0 −B1) which should give 4 values, θ1 .. θ4, i.e. 2 each
for each state variable. One gets a stable stationary steady state when there
are 2 roots within the unit circle and 2 outside. With one root within the
unit circle, there is no stable stationary steady state. With 3 roots within the
unit circle, indeterminancy follows. In our simulations, we found the number
of unit roots to be in the unit circle to depend quite sensitively on parameter
choices. The generic outcome was either 2 or 3 roots within the circle.
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